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major acquisitions, sales, and liquidations, and over the removal of the general
manager, should rest with the investors.
(6) Consider the co-ordination of the above factors, and balance them so that
the protection intended by the act is provided by the form of the offering, the
character of the offerees, or by a combination of both.
(7) Or consider applying to the Commissioner for a permit to issue securities
to the public.
Lindell L. Marsh*
* Member, Third Year Class.
JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON THE INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA MUNICIPALITIES
The mitiative and referendum are reserved to the electors of counties and
municipalities by article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution.' Three types
of legislation, however, are placed by specific exemption beyond reach of a refer-
endum of the general electorate of the state: acts calling elections, acts providing
for tax levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of the state, and
urgency measures necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health, or safety, passed by a two-thirds vote of the state legislature.2 These con-
stitutional limitations on exercise of the referendum extend to chartered cities, in
1 In CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 the people of California have reserved to themselves
the powers of initiative and referendum. Under the initiative provisions of the Constitu-
tion, a law or amendment to the Constitution proposed in a petition signed by a small
percentage of the electorate must be submitted to a vote of the entire electorate. A law
may be smilarly proposed to the legislature, which must enact or reject it within forty
days. If the law is rejected or no action is taken within forty days, it must be submitted
to the people for approval or rejection.
The power of referendum may be exercised to reject acts passed by the legislature.
No act passed by the legislature, except for those mentioned in the text, goes into effect
until niety days after the final adjournment of the session of the legislature which
passed the act. If a petition signed by the required percentage of electors is presented to
the Secretary of State asking that the act be submitted to the electorate, the law cannot
go into effect until approved by majority vote in an election.
It should also be noted that any law which has gone into effect may subsequently
be repealed by initiative-though measures adopted by initiative can be repealed or
amended only by a vote of the electors.
2 CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
8 Hunt v. Mayor & Council of City of Riverside, 31 Cal. 2d 619, 191 P.2d 426
(1948). The CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6, authorizes the legislature to provide for the
incorporation, organization, and classification of cities and towns. It is also provided
that cities and towns may organize under charters framed and adopted under the au-
thority of the constitution by a board of freeholders chosen by their electors for that
purpose. CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6. Chartered cities may draw up or amend their charters
May, 1966] NOTES
the absence of a special charter provision, 4 and also to counties5 and general law
cities.6 Besides these constitutional restrictions on the referendum, a number of
judicial limitations on both the initiative and referendum have evolved. The
subject of this note is those judicial limitations about which there seems to be
the greatest uncertainty m California: (1) limitation of both the initiative and
referendum to legislative, as opposed to administrative, decisions of local councils;
(2) limitation of both to matters of "city-wide" concern, as opposed to those
which affect only a portion of the local electorate; and (3) limitation of the
initiative to such measures as the legislative body itself could pass.
The Legzslative-Admintstrative Limitation
In California there is generally no division of legislative and executive respon-
sibilities between separate local governmental departments as there is at the state
and federal level. The powers to make legislative and administrative decisions
frequently coexist m the local council.7 Where this is the case, the courts hold
that only legislative decisions may be initiated by, or referred to, the local elec-
torate.8 Since the exercise of the initiative and referendum by the state electorate
is constitutionally confined to determinations of the legislative branch of the state
government,9 this limitation, on its face, is no more than a logical application to
inferior governing bodies of the same limitation already existing at the state level
so as to become empowered to make and enforce laws and regulations m respect to
municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations contained xi their respective
charters. In all other matters they remain subject to and are controlled by general state
laws. CAl.. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 8.
4 Hunt v. Mayor & Council of City of Riverside, supra note 3.
5 Geiger v. Board of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 2d 832, 313 P.2d 545 (1957).
6 Cf. Hunt v. Mayor & Council of City of Riverside, 31 Cal. 2d 619, 191 P.2d 426
(1948); Dye v. Council of City of Compton, 80 Cal. App. 2d 486, 182 P.2d 623 (1947).
Although these cases dealt with chartered cities, the statements of the applicable law
were not restricted to such cities. In Hunt the court said that the Constitution reserved
no power of referendum to the people over a city ordinance levying a sales tax for the
purpose of meeting the usual and current expenses of the city. Hunt v. Mayor & Council
of City of Riverside, supra at 623-24, 191 P.2d at 428. In Dye the court, xi holding that
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 allowed the referendum to be invoked against sections and
parts of ordinances although the charter contained no such provision, said that "the
constitutional power of referendum possessed by the electors of a city is identical with
that reserved i the Constitution by the people of the State." Dye v. Council of City of
Compton, supra at 489, 182 P.2d at 625. See CAL.. EIxcrioNs ConE § 4050.
7 Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 610, 150 Pac. 977, 978
(1915).
8 See, e.g., Dwyer v. City Council of Berkeley, 200 Cal. 505, 253 Pac. 932 (1927);
Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 150 Pac. 977 (1915); Reagan v.
City of Sausalito, 210 Cal. App. 2d 618, 26 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1962); Martin v. Smith,
184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1960); Knowlton v. Hezmalhalch, 32 Cal. App.
2d 419, 89 P.2d 1109 (1939); Burdick v. City of San Diego, 29 Cal. App. 2d 565, 84
P.2d 1064 (1938); McKevitt v. City of Sacramento, 55 Cal. App. 117, 203 Pac. 132
(1921). See generally 5 McQurlmn oN Mu cniAL CormPoRATioNs §§ 16.55, 16.57 (3d
ed. 1949); Comment, Ltmitations on Initiative and Referendum, 3 STr. L. REv. 497,
502-04.
9 CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 1, Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond, supra note 8.
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Decisions of California courts, however, indicate that this limitation has actually
been used to achieve two completely different objectives: (1) to confine the initia-
tive process to determinations of municipal policy, in contrast to the methods of
carrying it out; and (2) to insulate certain lands of state legislation from local
interference except as such legislation specifically authorizes. The courts have been
fairly successful in using this limitation to reach the first objective, but the limita-
tion can and should be abandoned in pursuit of the second.
In order to understand the difficulties into which the Califorma courts have
fallen by using the legislative-administrative distinction for these two different
purposes, it is necessary to consider the origin of the limitation and then its
application in confining the initiative to policy determinations. The first Califorma
case to use the compass of the legislative power of a local council as a limit to the
scope of the initiative process was Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond,'0 in
which the Califorma Supreme Court held that the decision to accept an offer of
land as the site for a city hall was legislative and therefore subject to referendum.
The court reasoned that under the constitution the initiative and referendum can
only be applied to overrule decisions made by the legislative branch of the state
government, and thus only legislative decisions of the local goverming body came
within the scope of the local initiative process. Holding that acceptance of land
for a city hall was in effect a selection of its site, the court went to great length
to describe decisions of the state legislature which were analogous to the selection
of a site for a city hall.
By this decision the limitation was established that only local legislative deci-
sions could be made by the electorate through the initiative or cancelled by
referendum. In determining whether a local decision was legislative or admimstra-
tive, the test was whether analagous action was taken by the legislative or ad-
mmistrative branch of the state government.
The courts in subsequent decisions," however, have altered this test. The
limitation of the initiative and referendum to legislative decisions remains; how-
ever, the courts have now redefined the term "legislative" so that it includes only
those decisions which establish new local policies.' 2 The crucial question has be-
come whether the effect of the act of the local council is to set a new policy or
merely to carry out one pre-existing. Denomination of decisions as "legislative" or
"admimstrative" according to their similarity to action taken by either the legis-
lative or executive branch of the government has become unimportant, but the
terms have not. Thus the act of accepting an offer of land as the site for a munici-
pal park may be "legislative" when two previous resolutions allegedly setting the
policy of creating such a park have been repealed,' 3 but "admnustrative" when
10 170 Cal. 605, 150 Pac. 977 (1915).
"1 E.g., Reagan v. City of Sausalito, 210 Cal. App. 2d 419, 26 Cal. Rptr. 775
(1962); Martin v. Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1960).
12"Acts constituting a declaration of public purpose, and making provisions for
ways and means of its accomplishment may be generally classified as calling for the
exercise of legislative power. Acts which are to be deemed as acts of administration,
and classed among those powers properly assigned to the executive department, are
those which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes al-
ready declared by the legislative body "McKevitt v. City of Sacramento, 55 Cal.
App. 117, 124, 203 Pac. 132, 136 (1921).
13 Reagan v. City of Sausalito, 210 Cal. App. 2d 419, 26 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1962).
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the city previously has established that policy by accepting funds in trust to
create the park.' 4 Similarly a decision which sets a new policy is not beyond
direct action by the electorate even though the city council attempts, by pro-
ceeding by resolution, to make an allegedly "administrative" determination.15
There are no patent evils in the continued use of this limitation to confine the
initiative and referendum to local policy-making decisions. Although the terms
are a relic of a forgotten rationale, the courts have applied them consistently to
achieve their objective. Moreover, the application of the "policy-making" rationale
has not resulted in radically different decisions, since most decisions of the state
legislature, toward which the Hopping court looked, set new policy. It is nn-
portant, however, to keep in mind present judicial use of the limitation to achieve
the first objective, because the courts have used it with less success to achieve
the second.
The second objective of the courts in applying the legislative-administrative
limitation has been to insulate certain state legislation from local interference ex-
cept as such legislation specifically authorizes. This legislation has been of two
kinds: (1) enactments by which the state places an absolute duty on a local
governing body to perform certain functions for the state; and (2) enactments
which represent a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to be uniform
throughout the state, but as part of which severely restricted discretion has been
left to local legislative bodies. Within the first class is the statute'16 which makes
it mandatory for county boards of supervisors to provide courtroom facilities for
the state courts. In cases where the board has chosen a site'7 or approved plians,' 8
and changes are sought to be made by the electorate, the courts have refused to
sanction popular interference. Within the second class, the courts have refused
to allow the initiative process to apply to the decision to declare a need for the
activation of a local housing authority19 or to approve the authority's application
for a federal loan after such a declaration 20 under the state Housing Authorities
Law,21 to pass a zomng ordinance pursuant to a cooperation agreement executed
between the housing authority and a mumcipality22 under the Housing Authorities
Cooperation Act,23 or to declare a need for a redevelopment agency2 4 under the
14 McKevitt v. City of Sacramento, 55 Cal. App. 117, 203 Pac. 132 (1921).
15 Hughes v. City of Luacoln, 232 Cal. App. 2d 743, 43 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1965).
16 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68073.
17 Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 222 P.2d 225 (1950).
18 Mueller v. Brown, 221 Cal. App. 2d 319, 34 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1963).
19 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34240. Cf. Housing Authority of the City of
Eureka v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219 P.2d 457 (1950); Kleiber v. City &
County of San Francisco, 18 Cal. 2d 718, 117 P.2d 657 (1941).
20 Housing Authority of the City of Eureka v. Superior Court, supra note 19.
2 1 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34200-380.
22 Lockhart v. City of Bakersfield, 123 Cal. App. 2d 728, 267 P.2d 871 (1954).
2 3 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34500-521.
24 Andrews v. City of San Bernardino, 175 Cal. App. 2d 459, 346 P.2d 457 (1959).
The version of § 33201 (Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 710, § 1, at 1928) at issue in Andrews
was subsequently amended (Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 2149, § 3, p. 4434) to provide for
referendum on the ordinance activating the local redevelopment agency. Present CAL.
HEALT-H & SAFET CODE § 33101 replaced former § 33201 and retains this provision.
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Community Redevelopment Law.25 In all of these cases the courts reasoned that
the state legislature has set the appropriate policy by its enactment, and the local
council becomes, for the purposes of implementing that policy, an administrative
agency of the state. Hence a local decision which merely effectuates state policy
is administrative and not subject to the initiative and referendum.
This use of the legislative-administrative limitation in connection with such
legislation is undesirable. It is clear that the distinction developed to confine the
initiative and referendum to local policy-making decisions, and it seems unreason-
able to hold that the decision to activate the housing authority in a municipality
or to choose the site for a courthouse does not establish a municipal policy of
the first magnitude. In the case of housing authorities, cases in other jurisdictions
have indicated that it does and that their activation is a legislative determination
subject to the initiative and referendum.26 In fact, to say that such a decision is
administrative because the local governing body is carrying out a previously estab-
lished state policy simply does not indicate why state policy precludes application
of the initiative and referendum to these decisions.
The answer to this question is most clearly stated in a growing body of au-
thority in California which avoids using the legislative-administrative limitation
in similar cases and instead forthrightly recognizes the state issue involved. The
reasoning in these decisions is that the constitutional reservation of the initiative
and referendum extends to municipal affairs only. Where the state legislature
occupies a field to the exclusion of local regulation, it ceases to be a municipal
affair.27 Therefore the initiative and referendum is precluded, unless provided for
in the legislative enactment. Representative of these cases is Mervynne v. Acker28
where a group of San Diego citizens, in a touching atfirmation of individual liberty
against the entangling encroachments of modem life, attempted to initiate an
ordinance repealing all the parking meter ordinances enacted by the city council
pursuant to Vehicle Code section 22508. There the court held that the control of
traffic was a matter of statewide concern, and that the state legislature had dele-
gated the narrow authority to locate parking meters to the legislative bodies of
cities only. There was no implied power in any municipality to enact legislation
in this field beyond what was specifically granted in the Vehicle Code, which
included no provision for the initiative and referendum with regard to parking
meter ordinances. 29 There are numerous other recent decisionss which, in deter-
25 CAL. HEALTH & S rAx= CODE §§ 33000-673.
26 See Scroggms v. Kerr, 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950); Barnes v. City of
Miami, 47 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1950); W B. Gibson Co. v. Warren Metropolitan Housing
Authority, 65 Ohio App. 84, 29 N.E.2d 236 (1940); Bacbmann v. Goodwin, 121 W Va.
303, 3 S.E.2d 532 (1939). See also opinion by Shenk, J., concurring and dissenting, in
Housing Authority of the City of Eureka v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 559, 219
P.2d 457, 462 (1950).27 See, e.g., In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962).
See generally Comment, 17 HAsTIGs L.J. 603 (1966).
28 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1961).
29 Shortly after the decision in Mervynne v. Acker, ibid., the state legislature
amended CAL. VEmcrE CODE § 22508 to read: "An ordinance adopted pursuant to this
section shall be subject to local referendum processes in the same manner as if such
ordinance dealt with a matter of purely local concern."
a0 E.g., OLoane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1965)
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mining whether the initiative and referendum are available to a local electorate,
have sharply differentiated between the questions of whether a decision involves
a matter of statewide concern and whether, if the matter is a municipal affair,
the decision is legislative or administrative.
It is clear that the courts in these cases are pursuing the same goal as the
courts m the cases which used the legislative-administrative distinction as a basis
for refusing to allow the initiative process to apply to some local decisions because
they carned out state legislative policy; namely, to insulate the implementation of
such policy from local tinkering.31 The use of the legislative-administrative limita-
tion merely confuses the issue, but it is still with us.3 2 It can and should be aban-
doned, as an alternative is available which poses and discusses the real issue in-
volved: when and why does state policy preclude local initiative and referendum?
Matters of Local Concern
Another question which has troubled some courts is whether a decision of the
city council to exercise its power to set up assessment districts for the improve-
ment of streets in one area of a city, or for other purposes which similarly affect
only a minority of the electors, is within the scope of the initiative process. Ad-
mittedly a legislative decision, an early California case, Chase v. Kalber,33 subse-
quently followed by two others,3 4 nevertheless placed it beyond initiative and
referendum on three grounds: (1) the requirement of the general state law that
an unchartered municipal corporation hold hearings after deciding to make dis-
trict assessments would be avoided if the decision could be invalidated by referen-
dum; (2) the people of the state in delegating the initiative and referendum to
local electorates did not intend them to apply where the inevitable effect would
be to impair or destroy some other essential governmental power; and (3) district
assessments and the like are of primarily local, as opposed to city-wide, concern
in that they affect only a portion of the electorate. None of these grounds is very
convincing, but discussion of their defects is best postponed to a more appropriate
part of this note.
As to general law cities this question is settled, because these early decisions
have been codified as an exception to the ordinances which are subject to referen-
dum in general law cities.3 5 It still arises with regard to chartered cities, however,
since such a city can make itself independent, in municipal affairs, of the general
(adoption of general plan a municipal affair and legislative); Atlas Hotels, Inc. v. Acker,
230 Cal. App. 2d 658, 41 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1964) (enactment of a transient room tax a
municipal affair and legislative); Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 368, 21 Cal. Rptr.
452 (1962) (clarification of duties of city planning commission a municipal affair and
legislative).
81 "The Simpson and Mueller cases point out that it is a matter of state interest
that each county provide suitable quarters for municipal and superior courts, and in
furtherance of that state interest the Legislature preempted the field by directing the
board of supervisors of each county to provide courthouses and courthouse sites." Atlas
Hotels, Inc. v. Acker, supra note 30, at 665, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (dictum).3 2 See, e.g., Mueller v. Brown, 221 Cal. App. 2d 319, 34 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1963).
3328 Cal. App. 561, 153 Pac. 397 (1915).
84 St. John v. King, 130 Cal. App. 356, 20 P.2d 123 (1933); Starbuck v. City of
Fullerton, 34 Cal. App. 683, 168 Pac. 583 (1917).
35 CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 4050.
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state law by an appropriate charter provision. The question was litigated in Alex-
ander v. Mitchell3 6 where the issue was the validity of a proposed initiative
ordinance which would have made every decision of the city council of Palo Alto
(a chartered city) to use district assessment proceedings to create off-street park-
ng facilities subject to referendum. The court held that the ordinance could not
be initiated, but the opinion served more to confuse than to clarify the status of
such a proceeding with regard to the initiative and referendum in chartered cities.
Without any analysis, the court concluded that off-street parking projects are
primarily of local (as opposed to city-wide) interest, just as are street and sewer
projects, and that all the reasons advanced in Chase37 and its offspring to bar the
referendum on decisions to initiate such projects in general law cities were appli-
cable in the case of chartered cities. For good measure, the court also added, on
dubious authority, that the referendum was precluded because the power to deter-
mine the necessity and advisability of parking district proceedings was delegated
to the legislative body of a city and not to the people.38
Deeper analysis would not necessarily have led to a decision that the ordi-
nance could be initiated, but it would have indicated that in chartered cities
matters of local concern can at least be made subject to referendum. The two im-
portant questions presented by such an ordinance must first be stated: (1) Are
legislative decisions which do not affect the entire electorate within the scope of
the constitutional delegation of the initiative and referendum? (2) If not, can
the scope of the initiative and referendum be expanded in chartered cities to include
such decisions? Determination of the first issue requires examination of the three
grounds offered in Chase for denying the referendum to electors in a general law
city in the same circumstances.
The statement in Chase that allowing the referendum to apply to district
assessment proceedings would prevent the city council from holding hearings as
required by state law,39 while perhaps a valid objection to referendum in general
law cities,40 is not relevant here, since a chartered city such as Palo Alto may make
itself, in municipal affairs, independent of the general state law. Therefore only
the other two grounds advanced in Chase to define the constitutional grant of the
initiative and referendum apply to a chartered city.
36119 Cal. App. 2d 816, 260 P.2d 261 (1953).
87 Chase v. Kalber, 28 Cal. App. 561, 153 Pac. 397 (1915).
38 The inconsistency of these two conclusions went unnoticed by the court. Only in
matters of statewide concern can the state legislature preclude the initiative and refer-
endum by vesting powers in the city council. Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558,
11 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1961). Off-street parking facilities, however, are a purely municipal
affair, and a chartered city can proceed under powers granted by state law or under
the powers conferred upon the city as a home-rule chartered city without the aid of
such legislation. Larsen v. City and County of San Francisco, 152 Cal. App. 2d 355,
313 P.2d 959 (1957). The Palo Alto city council in Alexander was proceeding under
powers granted its own Improvement Code, Alexander v. Mitchell, 119 Cal. App. 2d
816, 822, 260 P.2d 261, 264 (1953), and therefore the argument that there could be no
initiative and referendum because the power to determine the necessity and advisability
of parking distnct proceedings is vested in the city council was unsound. See also
Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 368, 21 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1962) (delegation of
powers to city council by charter does not preclude initiative and referendum).
39 28 Cal. App. at 573, 153 Pac. at 401.
40 See Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958).
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The second ground urged in Chase is that the people of the state in delegating
the initiative and referendum to local electorates did not intend them to apply
where their inevitable effect would be to impair or wholly destroy some other
essential governmental power.41 This is clearly an erroneous interpretation of the
constitutional grant, based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the initiative
process. In In re Pfahler,42 the Supreme Court of Califorma held that the initiative
and referendum do not bar, impair, suspend, or destroy any governmental power.
The power continues to exist fully intact after the exercise of either the initiative
or referendum, the electorate merely having asserted its constitutional right to
determine in place of the legislative body whether the power should or should
not be exercised. It is true that the people through the initiative process can make
it extremely awkward for a governing body to exercise a particular power, but
this does not imply that it ceases to exist. The second ground offered in Chase
is without foundation, and it should not be relied upon in deciding whether to
allow referenda on matters of local concern in any city.
There is more substance to the third ground in Chase. There is an obvious
danger, in allowing matters of local concern to be subject to initiative and referen-
dum, that a majority of the electorate could place the burden of expensive munic-
ipal improvements on a small minority of the citizens through initiated district
assessment proceedings. Or a majority could by referendum frustrate improve-
ments essential to a few. It is certainly arguable that the constitutional delegation
of the initiative and referendum is therefore limited to matters which affect the
entire electorate. On the other hand, from the exemption of certain matters from
the constitutional reservation of the initiative and referendum to the electors of
the state, it would seem to be implied that all other state or local legislation is
included.
This latter conclusion, of course, destroys much of the foundation for the argu-
ment advanced in Alexander. But the inquiry need not end there. Even if the
argument in Alexander is accepted that the constitutional delegation of the initia-
tive and referendum does not include matters of local concern, the second ques-
tion posed by the ordinance in Alexander, but not answered in the opinion, must
be considered: Can the scope of the initiative and referendum be expanded to
include decisions on matters of local concern in chartered cities? The answer is
that it can be, but by charter amendment only. The rule is stated in Hunt v.
Mayor and Council of City of Riversnde:
The constitutional reservation goes to the full extent expressed by its lan-
guage. If the charter differs from the Constitution m any respect, it does not
thereby diminish the power reserved by the Constitution. On the other hand, if
the powers reserved by the charter exceed those reserved in the Constitution, the
effect of the charter would be to give the people the additional powers therein
described. 43
Charter amendments may be initiated, but the amendment must conform to the
formal requirements set out in the constitution.44 The ordinance sought to be
4128 Cal. App. at 569-70i 153 Pac. at 400.
42150 Cal. 71, 88 Pac. 270 (1906).
43 Hunt v. Mayor & Council of City of Riverside, 31 Cal. 2d 619, 622-23, 191 P.2
426, 428 (1948).
44 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 8(h).
[Vol. 17
initiated in Alexander did not, and to that extent the court was correct in refusing
to force the city council to submit it to a vote of the electorate.
This was not, however, the court's reason for refusing to do so and, this deci-
sion therefore must not be taken as authority that the initiative and referendum
may not apply to decisions on local matters in chartered cities. The conclusion
in Alexander that matters of local concern were not included in the constitutional
delegation of the initiative process based on Chase is debatable and probably un-
sound. Moreover, the court never discussed the question of whether the scope
of the referendum could be expanded in chartered cities. It clearly can be, and
there is therefore no reason why the initiative and referendum may not be applied
to matters of local concern in chartered cities.
Limitations on the Initiative
At the local level an additional limitation is placed on the initiative: the pro-
posed measure must be such as the legislative body itself could adopt. The initia-
tive process is thus circumscribed by the same limitations as the legislative powers
resting in the legislative body concerned.45 Such limitations may exist because
the state m granting certain powers to a municipality has prescribed certain re-
quirements which must be complied with in exercising these powers. If the exer-
cise of the initiative is incompatible with conformity to these requirements, then
its use is precluded. For example in Hurst v. City of Burlingame4O it was held
that an amendment to the local zoning ordinance could not be adopted by mitia-
tive where the general state zoning law authorizing municipal corporations to
adopt comprehensive local zoning ordinances required public hearings before
adoption of amendments. The court reasoned that municipal corporations orga-
nized under general law have only those powers delegated to them by the legis-
lature, and the electors can exercise no greater power. Since the city council could
not adopt amendments without holding a hearing, and it was impossible for the
electorate to hold hearings, the proposed initiative amendment failed. In a later
case 47 an initiative ordinance which would have regulated the height of buildings
by prohibiting the local council from granting zoning variances for buildings over
fifty feet high was void because the state empowered municipalities to regulate
the height of buildings by zoning ordinance only.48
This doctrine does not only limit or deny the use of the initiative where it
conflicts with state requirements; it also raises other barners. An initiative ordi-
nance must be within the power of the local council to pass. For example, in
Mitchell v. Walker49 it was held that a proposed ordinance which would have
bound the Monrovia city council to set the salanes of policemen amd firemen
according to those paid by the City of Los Angeles to similar employees could
not be initiated because the general law vested the authority to fix municipal
salaries in the city council which could not pass an ordinance delegating it to
another legislative body. In a later case,5 0 it was held that an ordinance could not
45 Mueller v. Brown, 221 Cal. App. 2d 319, 34 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1963).
46 207 Cal. 134, 277 Pac. 308 (1929).
47 Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City Council, 187 Cal. App. 2d 412, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 775 (1960).
48 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65800.
49 140 Cal. App. 2d 239, 295 P.2d 90 (1956).
50 Mueller v. Brown, 221 Cal. App. 2d 319, 34 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1963).
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be initiated winch attempted to set up a permanent park and in effect bind future
legislative bodies to maintain it. The court reasoned that the Fresno County Board
of Supervisors had no power to enact perpetually binding legislation, and there-
fore neither did the county electorate.
These cases indicate that the constitutional reservation of the initiative does
not constitute an independent source of legislative power, but rather authorizes
the people to exercise municipal legislative powers derived from other sources.
They may legislate in place of their legislative body, but only within the frame-
work of powers granted to municipalities by the constitution and state law. In
most cases their legislative power is as great as that of the local legislative body,
but it may be less where the initiative conflicts with certain state requirements.
This limitation on the initiative was inadequately discussed in the recent
California case of Hughes v. City of Lncoln.51 There a group opposed to fluonda-
tion wished the court to compel the city council to submit to an election an
ordinance which was supposed to prevent the council from carrying out a previ-
ously passed resolution to fluoridate. This was the text of the measure: 'It shall
be unlawful for any agent or employee of the City of Lincoln, or any person, firm,
or corporation acting in behalf of said City, or otherwise, to mingle or combine
any fluorides m any form, or in any quantity or in any manner with the public
water supply of the City of Lincoln."52 The court concluded that fluoridation in-
volved a municipal legislative decision and therefore could properly be the sub-
ject of an initiative ordinance.
For some reason the court did not consider the effect of this ordinance. The
text indicates that it was intended to do more than merely repeal the prior resolu-
tion to fluoridate. Although drawn in the language of a normal prohibitory ordi-
nance, it was in fact an attempt to remove from the council the power to fluoridate
and reserve that decision to the electorate. It does- not say in so many words that
the council shall not have the power to fluoridate, but in denying it the means
to exercise that power, the ordinance effectively accomplishes the same goal. And
this was clearly the intention of the proponents of the measure who understand-
ably wished to settle the question and avoid having repeatedly to resort to the
referendum.
It is well settled, however, that such a measure could not be passed by the
Lincoln city council. A legislative body by ordinance or otherwise cannot divest
itself and succeeding legislative bodies of powers vested in it by the general law
for the benefit of its constituents.58 Nor can it by contract or legislative enactment
delegate or surrender its police power.5 4 One qualification to this general rule of
inseparability of legislative power from the legislative body involves the initiative
and referendum. As pointed out in In re Pfahler,55 the exercise of the initiative
and referendum removes from the council the power to act on the matter in
question and lodges that power in the people. Neither that case nor any other,
however, indicates that the delegation of the initiative and referendum gives to
51232 Cal. App. 2d 743, 43 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1965).
52 Opening Brief for Appellants, p. 2, Hughes v. City of Lincoln, supra note 51.
58 Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 144 Cal. 281, 283, 77 Pac. 951, 952 (1904).
54 Mott v. Cline, 200 Cal. 434, 253 Pac. 718 (1927); Laurel Hill Cemetery v.
City & County of San Francisco, 152 Cal. 464, 93 Pac. 70 (1907).
55 150 Cal. 71, 88 Pac. 270 (1906).
[vol. 17THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
